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Abstract 
In recent years, Denmark has been successful in ensuring and maintaining a low 
unemployment rate. However, almost one third of the working-age population remains 
dependent on public transfers, a fact which poses questions on both social inclusion and 
financial pressures on the welfare state. In this paper, we consider more closely the 
interaction between the social safety net and the need and scope for maintaining a high 
employment rate in a welfare state of the Scandinavian type. The focus is on the basic 
dilemma between ambitious distributional goals on the one hand and work incentives on 
the other. The paper discusses policy issues related to minimizing welfare dependence 
that improve the transition from welfare to work. We consider these issues in a life 
cycle perspective considering entry into the labour market, maintenance of labour 
market contact, and exit from the labour market. Finally, we consider some recent 
reform proposals and initiatives in Denmark. 
Keywords: Incentives to work, Social safety net, Distribution 
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2  IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State 1 Introduction 
The Scandinavian welfare model, of which Denmark is an example, has very ambitious 
distributional objectives. This is reflected in an extended social safety net, pension 
schemes, and an unemployment compensation system that offers relatively generous 
benefit levels and duration periods in an international comparison. A further 
characteristic is that minimum wages in the labour market are relatively high, 
precluding working poor in accordance with distributional goals. This policy raises 
important challenges with respect to equal opportunities for jobs and social inclusion. 
There are problems associated with both maintaining incentives to work and the fact 
that a generous social safety net causes a high wage level hampering demand for less 
qualified labour. At the same time, it is essential for the financial viability of the welfare 
model that a large fraction of the population is in employment. 
The economic performance in Denmark has recently attracted wide attention. After a 
long period with high and persistent unemployment, the unemployment rate has been 
low (4-5 percent) for a number of years and all standard macro indicators like growth, 
inflation, the current account, and the budget balance are favourable. Much of the 
international attention has centred on the interpretation of the Danish labour market as a 
flexicurity-model, which has shown how to combine extended social security with 
labour market flexibility conducive for employment. This tends to overlook the fact that 
the recent favourable performance of the Danish labour market can hardly be attributed 
to the flexicurity model per se since its main ingredients were also in place during the 
1970s and 1980s with high and persistent unemployment rates. It seems more plausible 
that the change should be attributed to macroeconomic policies
1 and a radical shift in 
labour market policies through a sequence of supply oriented reforms, mainly during the 
1990s. The reforms included a shortening of the unemployment benefit duration, stricter 
eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits and the introduction of workfare 
elements (see e.g. Andersen and Svarer 2007 a,b, for details).  
                                                 
 
1 The shift in macroeconomic policy originated in the early 1980s when a soft exchange rate policy and extensive 
fiscal activism were replaced with a fixed exchange rate policy and a more medium-term focused fiscal policy. This 
so-called “stability” oriented policy has been pursued since then. The decline in unemployment in the early 1990s can 
IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State  3 Figure 1 Unemployment and recipients of income transfers 




















1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
%
 
Note: The number of recipients of income transfers is in full-time equivalents and excludes individuals receiving 
social security pension. Since 2004, the legal pension age has gradually been reduced from 67 years to 65 years. This 
accounts for part of the drop in the ratio of transfer income recipients to the population of working ages in 2005 and 
2006.  
 
Without depreciating the achievements of the labour market reforms, it is also part of 
the story that the share of the population in working age groups relying on one form of 
transfer income or another has not shown a similar decrease as the unemployment rate, 
cf.  Figure 1. Almost one third of the age group 15-66 (the working population) is 
dependent on some form of public income transfer.
2 A rough decomposition into main 
                                                                                                                                               
in part be attributed to an expansionary fiscal policy partly caused by the phasing in of a tax reform reducing the 
marginal tax on labour income and, among other things, reducing the tax value of interest rate deductibility. 
2 The figures only include transfers that substitute ordinary income. Individuals who receive supplementary income 
transfers like e.g. child care benefits or rent support are not included. 
4  IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State recipient groups reveals that in 2005, 4 percent of the working population receive 
unemployment compensation, 3 percent receive sickness pay or maternity leave pay, 6 
percent receive educational grants, 5 percent are in early publicly financed retirement 
programmes, 4 percent receive social assistance including individuals in activation and 
rehabilitation programmes, and 7 percent are on disability pension. 
The large fraction of the working population relying on income transfers – the 
transfer problem – is a severe problem for several reasons. First, while the large number 
of individuals in the schemes shows that the arrangements in the welfare state are used, 
it is not in itself a purpose of an extended welfare state to have a large number of people 
relying on transfers. The large fraction of people being dependent on transfers reveals 
that it has not been possible to achieve equal opportunities for all to find a job and 
become self-supporting and therefore, these numbers may indicate a marginalization 
problem. However, the gross numbers reported in Figure 1b give the upper bound to 
this problem since they also include arrangements which serve a welfare purpose, like 
extended maternity leave schemes or initiatives to improve long-term employment 
possibilities like education (study grants). Below, we return to a more detailed account 
of the transfer problem. Second, in an extended welfare state like the Danish one, the 
employment rate has significant public finance implications. A drop in employment of 1 
percent would imply a deterioration of 0.8 percent in the public budget balance (relative 
to GDP) due to the combined effects of lower tax revenue and increasing expenditures 
on transfers.
3 Finally, it should be noted that the social arrangements and the social 
safety net are intimately related to key objectives, not least crucial distributional 
objectives in the welfare state. Hence, the policy dilemma is how to combine these 
objectives with a high employment rate.  
The “transfer” problem has attracted additional interest since demographic changes 
are causing a substantial trend increase in the dependency ratio, due to the effect of the 
baby-boom generation approaching retirement and the increase in longevity, cf. Figure 
2a. A consequence of demographic developments is both that the labour force is 
                                                 
3 The estimate is for Denmark and is based on the effects of a drop in private employment among people who are 
entitled to unemployment benefits. The estimate is calculated on the basis of analyses in the Danish Welfare 
Commission (2006). 
IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State  5 shrinking (Figure 2b) and that public finances worsen significantly (see e.g. Andersen 
and Pedersen 2006). These facts have intensified the focus on the question “can other 
groups be more integrated in the labour market?” to mitigate the twin problems of 
dwindling labour supply and deteriorating public finances. 
Figure 2 Recipients of public transfers per individual in the age group 1566 years, 
including projections, and projection of demographic effects on the domestic labour 
force 
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Note: The projection is based on the assumption that current rules remain unchanged. 
Source: DREAM (2006). 
 
In this paper, we analyse more closely the interaction between the social safety net 
and the need and scope for maintaining a high employment rate in a welfare state of the 
Scandinavian type. The focus is on the basic dilemma between distributional concerns 
and incentives and therefore, we mainly deal with the margins of labour market 
participation (the extensive margin). By implication, general issues related to labour 
market policies including taxation, education, training etc. are not addressed. We 
6  IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State consider the Danish experience which is interesting not only for its own sake, but also 
because it is pointing to some difficulties in policy choices, and to “what works, and 
what does not”. 
In Section 2, we start by clarifying some key elements of the social safety net in 
Denmark and the policy dilemmas it creates in terms of reconciling distributional 
concerns with a high employment rate. Some principle arguments essential for these 
issues are addressed in Section 3. We then consider the social-safety net in a life-time 
perspective, that is, entry into the labour market as young (Section 4), risk of 
marginalization for people in the work force (Section 5) and retirement (Section 6). In 
Section 7, we offer a brief overview of some of the proposals made by the Welfare 
Commission on how to address the “transfer problem” and maintain the key properties 
of the welfare system, and Section 8 outlines some recent policy initiatives in Denmark. 
Finally, Section 9 offers some concluding remarks. 
2  The social safety net and the labour market 
The labour market is pivotal for the Danish welfare model. This is so not only because 
the labour market sets the frame for availability and distribution of jobs and incomes, 
but also because a welfare model relying on a large public sector with a high level of 
taxation has the precondition that the employment rate is high. This is the case for three 
reasons: i) the financing of the welfare state is mainly via direct and indirect taxation of 
incomes generated in the labour market, ii) the social safety net implies that most 
individuals without an income in the labour market would be entitled to some form of 
transfer, and iii) a number of welfare services are taken care of by the public sector 
where labour is needed.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, significant problems arose with respect to maintaining a 
high employment ratio. Unemployment was rising and became persistent at a high level. 
Labour market policies were mainly passive in their focus, aiming at income 
maintenance for unemployed as well as a reduction in labour supply via e.g. early 
IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State  7 retirement
4. This track was both socially and economically untenable. The employment 
focus was reinacted by a policy shift in the early part of the 1990s. Since then, the 
employment focus has been pursued in a sequence of partial reforms adding up to a very 
significant policy shift. These policy reforms strengthened the eligibility for 
unemployment benefits, shortened the benefit duration from 7 to 4 years, and excluded 
job training periods from the employment criteria that would allow individuals to 
remain eligible for unemployment benefits. A “right and duty” principle was launched 
stressing the right to a transfer income but, at the same time, a duty to try to become 
self-supporting. The “duty” part could be education or activation in the form of e.g. job-
training (see below). Initially, the “right and duty” principle applied to the 
unemployment insurance system, but it was extended to the social safety net in general 
via the law on active social assistance from 1998. This policy shift can be interpreted as 
an attempt at re-establishing the employment focus of the welfare model, also cf. below. 
The employment orientation of the Scandinavian welfare model is reflected by the 
fact that labour force participation rates are high by international standards. Figure 3 
shows the age dependent labour force participation rates in Denmark and compares 
them to the max and min within OECD. It is seen that Denmark is close to the max for 
prime age groups. 
It is often highlighted as a hallmark of the Scandinavian Welfare Model that it is 
universal and that labour has been decommodified (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990). 
There are reasons to qualify these defining characteristics. Universality is not equivalent 
to unconditionality. The social safety net in Denmark is universal in the sense that it is 
an individual entitlement (constitutional right, although recently with a more explicit 
entry criterion, see Table 1 below), but it is not unconditional and therefore, it is remote 
from a basic income or demo grant system. With some nuances, it is a precondition that 
individuals of normal working ages are available for the labour market unless, via some 
screening, they have been found unfit for work or are eligible for voluntary retirement 
(in Danish “efterløn”).  
                                                 
4 In the early 1990s, a paid leave scheme was introduced based on the perception that unemployment was caused by 
an excessive labour supply relative to labour demand (lump of labour fallacy). However, this policy was quickly 
dismantled when unemployment dropped. 
8  IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State To see this more clearly, consider the main element of the social safety net, social 
assistance (in Danish “kontanthjælp”)
5. This scheme offers support to individuals 
having been exposed to a social event like unemployment, illness, divorce etc. The 
assistance is means tested on a family basis, that is, the income/wealth of the spouse is 
also of importance for the assistance offered. Moreover, the social assistance is 
dependent on a number of criteria including age and children. There is a possibility of 
individual supplements and recipients of social assistance will usually also be eligible 
for a housing subsidy (also means tested). Almost all transfers are gross income and 
thus, taxable income. 
Figure 3 Age dependent labour force participation rates in Denmark and maximum and 
minimum values for OECD 
 
Source: Danish Welfare Commission (2006). 
 
                                                 
5 The system has been repeatedly changed over the years. The recent system builds on the law on active social 
assistance from 1998. It can be seen as an extension of the “Rights and duties” principle introduced in labour market 
policies, namely that the individual has a right to transfer but also a duty to try to become self-supporting. The latter 
is mainly tested via activation requirements. As discussed in Section 5, there are now activation requirements 
associated with social assistance. 
IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State  9 Table 1 Income transfers in Denmark, selective schemes, individual entitlements in 
Euro, 2006 
 Eligibility  and 
financing 
Conditions Gross  amount  per 
year, EUR 
Number of recipients 
2005 and share of the 
population 15-66 
years 
Educational aid  Universal, available 
to individuals at least 
18 years old, means 
tested 
Enrolled and actively 





Living with parents: 
3,880€  








employment in 12 
months 
Renewed benefit 
period: regular work 


















Universal   Conditioned on 
employment prior to 
the receipt  




on age and means 
tested for married 




support, living in DK 






Above 25 years: 
13,526€ 
 
Below 25 years: 
8,717€ 
 
Below 25 years: 
4,208€ 
and living with 
parents 




133,000 or 4 percent 
Start assistance  As social assistance. 
Not available for 
individuals with a 
residence permit 
based on family 
reunification (except 
to refugees)  
Living in DK in less 




b  Visitation  Age group 18 to 65 






264,000 or 7 percent 
Including flexjobs
d: 
300,000 or 8 percent 
Early retirement  Voluntary, 
contribution based, 
tax subsidized 
Age group 60-65, 
membership of an UI-
fund and contribution 
paid for at least 30 
years 
At age 60: 20,319€ 
 
At age 62: 22,340€ 










on civil status, and 
supplements are 
means tested 
From the age of 65, 
proportional 
reduction if residence 
in DK is less than 40 





700,000 or 19 percent 
 
Notes: All transfers are taxable income. Amount calculated in euro according to central parity DKK-euro. a) in 
addition there is a child supplement of 4,342 euro, b) According to the rule applying for new entrants to the disability 
pension after 2002. c) Amounts are given as the base pension + supplements. d) Flexjobs require visitation, 
subsidized jobs with loss of work capacity. e) The intake to the voluntary early retirement scheme for the age group 
50-59 years was stopped in 1996. 
Source: Forsikringsoplysingen, Sociale Ydelser, Statistic Denmark, Registerbased Labour marked Statistics and own 
calculations. 
10  IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State The social assistance system is fairly complicated, reflecting an attempt to strike a 
balance between different objectives in the welfare state. This is illustrated by the 
following listing of some of the main conditions: (i) Labour market availability criteria: 
all recipients of social assistance are required to actively search for jobs and participate 
in so-called activation measures (see Section 5 below). (ii) Time dependence:  after 
receiving assistance for more than six months, there is an upper cap on the sum of social 
assistance and supplements, for most people implying a reduction in the total assistance 
level. Special rules apply to young recipients, see Section 4. (iii) Employment criteria: 
For a married couple there is a work requirement of at least 300 hours of regular work 
within the last 2 years to qualify for assistance, and if this condition is not met, only one 
person receives social assistance. (iv) Earned income credit: In general, all income is 
deducted from the social assistance, but if the person receives a reduced assistance 
level, cf (ii), part of the work income is not deducted in the social assistance, so that the 
incentives to work are increased. (v) Entry condition: entitlement presupposes that the 
individual has been living in Denmark for 7 out of the past 8 years (or fulfils the 
conditions for eligibility according to EU rules), otherwise the person would only be 
entitled to social assistance at a lower level, the so-called “start assistance” (in Danish 
“starthjælp”).  
The main elements of the social safety net are briefly sketched in Table 1 giving the 
conditions for receiving various benefits, their level and the use of the scheme. As is 
seen from the table, the social safety net in the Danish welfare system is highly 
conditional and labour market focused. Considering the population in the age group 15-
66 in 2006 consisting of 3,688 thousand individuals, 2,805 thousand individuals 
(76  percent) are in the labour force, 1,125 thousand individuals (30 percent) are 
receiving transfers
6 and only 163 thousand individuals (4 percent) are outside these 
classifications. Hence, discussions of labour market participation should be seen from 
the perspective that this is essentially the default option given the way welfare 
                                                 
 
6 Unemployed individuals, individuals in so-called flexjobs, and individuals on maternity leave and sickness benefits 
are included in both the labour force and the number of individuals receiving transfers. In addition, part of the group 
of individuals receiving disability pensions work in e.g. part time jobs and are therefore included in the labour force 
as well. Finally, the labour force includes individuals who are older than 66 years. For these reasons, the sum of 
IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State  11 arrangements are structured. The key questions with respect to labour market incentives 
are thus i) the incentive for active job search, including reservation demands with 
respect to wage, job types, geographical location etc., ii) incentives and options for 
acquiring a labour market relevant education and training, and iii) the scope for leaving 
the labour force either via schemes available for individuals with reduced work 
capability (what are the criteria etc.) or via voluntary schemes like early retirement (see 
Section 6). 
In policy debates in Denmark, distributional concerns play a key role. At a formal 
level, all transfers are indexed to wages (in Danish “satsreguleringsloven”). The rules 
are fairly complicated but they imply that transfers are indexed to the average wage 
developments in the labour market
7. The Danish Economic Council (2006) has shown 
that the indexation of transfers over the period 1988-2004 is roughly equivalent to 
having transfers proportional to the median real income. Essentially, this rule thus 
ensures an unchanged distribution between those in and out of work
8. Irrespective of the 
technicalities of the indexing formula, it is a condition in policy debates that 
strengthening labour market incentives via general reductions in benefit levels is not 
acceptable. This explains why the basic system of social assistance has developed into a 
very complicated system and attempts at improving incentives and screening have been 
introduced via other mechanisms, cf. above. We discuss some of these in detail below. 
The social safety net can also be assessed by considering poverty. The poverty rate is 
low in international comparison, with only 4 percent of the population being below the 
poverty line defined at 50 percent of median income (an annual income level of about 
EUR 10,100 in 2004), and 9 percent below the poverty line defined by 60 percent of the 
median income, cf. Danish Economic Council (2006).
9 No full time employed 
individual is below the poverty line (no working poor) and individuals in basic welfare 
                                                                                                                                               
individuals receiving public transfers and the labour force may exceed the number of individuals in the age group 15-
66 years. 
7 The current indexing formula is from a law enacted in 1990 (revised in 2003) according to which all transfers are 
indexed on the basis of the annual wage two years earlier. If the increase is above 2 per cent, 0.3 per cent is 
transferred to a fund (satsreguleringspuljen) which can be used for initiatives aiming at improving the conditions for 
people on transfers. 
8 In policy debates, changes in various measures of inequality play an important role, even to the extent that attempts 
at fine-tuning the Gini coefficient are often proposed. 
9 Calculations based on equivalent income. 
12  IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State arrangements like disability pensions or ordinary pension would normally remain above 
the poverty line. The group with an income below the poverty line includes some young 
people in education, some self-employed and some individuals with only a marginal 
attachment to the labour market, including some immigrants. The transition out of 
poverty is large, with a hazard rate out of poverty of about 75 percent the first year. 
However, poverty is persistent for a small group of about 10 percent. 
3  Incentives and distribution – principles and 
policy trade-offs 
The design of the social safety net reflects basic distributional considerations. Given the 
political resistance to benefit reductions and the tight relation between benefit levels and 
wage developments, it is reasonable to interpret the political constraint as applying to 
the lowest income or consumption possibilities acceptable in society. The level of social 
benefits sets a floor for wage formation
10 on which the whole wage distribution stands. 
It is inevitable that some unemployment is implied by binding lower wage levels 
(minimum wages). This raises some issues on both the demand and supply side of the 
labour market.  
On the demand side, the most obvious implication is that binding minimum wages 
reduce labour demand. A consequence of this is that groups with low qualifications tend 
to be in excess supply, i.e. their qualifications are too low relative to the minimum 
wage. This problem may be reinforced over time when benefits are indexed to the 
average wage developments. If productivity increases more for “high” skilled jobs than 
for “low” skilled jobs (skill-bias), it follows that the gap between wage demands and the 
distribution of qualifications at the lower end of the distribution worsens over time. 
There are two ways of mitigating these demand problems under the constraint that 
benefit levels cannot be changed, namely, wage subsidies or educational/training to 
increase qualifications and reduce the groups with few labour market relevant 
qualifications. 
                                                 
10 In Denmark, minimum wages are negotiated in the labour market and thus not directly regulated politically. 
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incentives. The whole complex making up the social safety net can be seen as an 
implicit insurance arrangement pertaining to the risk associated with work capability, 
employment and wages/incomes. If agents are risk averse and private markets offer 
insufficient options for diversification of these risks, the social safety net may not only 
have a direct beneficial welfare effect, but also be conducive to a well-functioning 
labour market (see e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer 1999; Sinn 1995). It is a basic principle 
of insurance that temporary shocks can easily be diversified whereas permanent shocks 
cannot. Moreover, both moral hazard and adverse selection problems are present. 
Therefore, there is a difficult choice to be made between providing short-run insurance 
and incentives for active job search. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) list a number of 
reasons for why the optimal profile for unemployment insurance has a time profile 
where the support eventually decreases in duration. Short-run insurance is thereby 
combined with incentives. In Denmark, there is a time dependency via the following 
main steps: unemployment benefits, unemployment benefits with activation (after one 
year), social assistance (after 4 years) with activation, and reduced social assistance. 
Whether this profile is sharp enough, in particular the 4-year duration of unemployment 
benefits, can be discussed. 
The social safety net also raises adverse selection problems since individual 
preferences, personal characteristics and abilities cannot be observed. Among those 
claiming assistance, there may thus be both some with low options for finding a job 
(low ability), and some who evaluate leisure highly or are very restrictive in their job 
ambitions (type of job, employer, wage, location etc.). To mitigate selection problems, 
the system includes various screening mechanisms including classification within the 
social assistance scheme and screening for disability pensions, flexjobs etc. 
Both the moral hazard and adverse selection problem can be addressed by 
associating activation (workfare) with requirements to claim benefits (unemployment or 
social assistance) (see e.g. Besley and Coate 1992, 1995)
11. First, consider the adverse 
selection mechanism. The activation requirement is both time consuming and may 
                                                 
11 For the various effects of activation, see Section 5 below. 
14  IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State involve other inconveniences, and this tends to make benefits less attractive for groups 
with a high value of leisure or narrow job ambitions, since they may then either opt out 
of the labour market or accept available job offers. The moral hazard problem is also 
addressed (see e.g. Andersen and Svarer 2007b) since adding an activation requirement 
(activation) to the conditions for claiming benefits implies that there is a utility loss 
upon the transition from passive transfers to activation, which strengthens the incentives 
to search for jobs. In other words, there is a motivation or threat effect of such workfare 
elements which strengthens labour market incentives. In addition, there are several other 
effects of activations policies which we discuss in Section 5. 
In assessing the incentives for the non-employed, there thus seems to be a choice 
between reducing benefit levels or associating activation requirements with the social 
safety net in the sense that they can both be used to strengthen incentives. If so, it may 
also be argued that they must be equivalent from a policy perspective since they 
basically work by making it less attractive to claim benefits (either by lowering the level 
of benefits or increasing the activation demands) and therefore, are equivalent in utility 
terms (see Besley and Coate 1992, 1995). However, the comparison between the two is 
not that simple. First, activation essentially works both to create a time profile and 
involve a stochastic penalty in the social safety net, and this has an anticipatory (threat 
or motivation) effect on incentives (see Andersen and Svarer 2007b), i.e. the two 
instruments are not necessarily equivalent even from a utility perspective. Second, from 
a political perspective, there is a significant difference between reducing benefits and 
imposing activation requirements, and the latter is much more acceptable than the 
former. This may reflect that the distributional concern is mainly associated with 
consumption possibilities
12, and that activation is a quid pro quo which can be 
interpreted in terms of reciprocity between the individual and society. Workfare can 
thus be interpreted as being justified by work norms, but also strengthening these by the 
implied sanctions if agents are not willing to offer some effort in return for receiving 
transfers. Finally, it should be mentioned that the direct public finance implications of 
                                                 
12 One important reason being that income or consumption possibilities are interpersonally comparable, while utility 
is not. 
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reductions and the latter to expenditure increases. 
There are two important policy dilemmas here, however. The first is the screening 
paradox related to activation requirements and the like. To the extent that this policy 
works, the consequence may be that those actually ending up in activation are the 
groups with severe problems in terms of meeting the requirements to obtain a job at 
given wage levels (low ability groups), while the stronger groups have left the system. 
Hence, it may seem as if the policy does not work (those on activation do not get jobs) 
and activation accomplishes nothing but punishing weak groups. The other dilemma is 
that with a binding distributional constraint, it inevitably follows that labour demand 
falls short of labour supply and hence, it may seem pointless to focus so much on job 
search for these groups. This view is problematic for several reasons. First, even with 
unemployment, it does not follow that employment is invariant to changes on the supply 
side (more job search, changed wage setting), especially in a small and open economy. 
Second, there is a dynamic aspect to this since slack job search criteria may imply that 
labour supply eventually comes to constrain demand, in particular if human capital 
depreciates over time. 
4  The young – entry to the labour market 
Youth unemployment is a particular problem since insufficient attachment to the labour 
market in the youth may cause persistent unemployment and marginalization from the 
labour market. This is in particular the case since youth unemployment is often related 
to lack of education and labour market relevant qualifications. During the high 
unemployment period from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s, youth unemployment was 
higher than the general unemployment rate and therefore, the youth unemployment 
problem naturally attracted particular interest, cf. Figure 4. 
In 1996, a youth unemployment programme was implemented and it has been 
extended since then. The basic idea of the programme was twofold, namely, to make 
periods on transfer short and strengthen the economic incentives to educate. These 
aspects were motivated by the fact that young people were to an increasing degree in 
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at the same time as the short-term economic incentive to undertake education was low 
(social assistance exceeded study grants). The youth unemployment programme 
addressed both of these problems. The programme introduced mandatory activation of 
all young unemployed below the age of 25 without a labour market relevant education 
after 6 months of unemployment. The activation could be an education programme with 
a duration of at least 18 months, possibly in the ordinary education system. At the same 
time, social assistance was lowered to about 50 percent of maximal unemployment 
benefits, which eliminated the gap between social assistance and the study grant. The 
programme was in a sequence of steps extended to include all young individuals and 
have mandatory activation no later than after 13 weeks. In 2003 the age group 25-29 
years was also included under the scheme, although this group would not face a lower 
compensation. 
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that the series has breaks after 1995.12 and 1999.12 
Source: www.statistikbanken.dk. 
 
The youth programme is thus an element of the shift from a passive to a more active 
oriented labour market and social policy launched during the 1990s (cf. Section 2) but, 
at the same time, it is a notable exception from the rule that benefit levels cannot be 
reduced. The latter is interesting from a political economy perspective since although 
there is a large political opposition against general benefit reductions, the reduction for 
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that young people entered life-long transfer dependency, attaining only marginal or no 
contact with the labour market. 
The effect of the youth unemployment programme is remarkable when considering 
the drop in the youth unemployment rate relative to the general unemployment rate, cf. 
Figure 4. It should, however, be noted that this happened in a positive business cycle 
climate and the overall unemployment rate also fell significantly over the same period. 
To the extent that youth unemployment is more sensitive to the business cycle stance, 
this may partly explain the shift in the relation of youth unemployment to the overall 
unemployment rate. 
There is, however, clear evidence that the programme had a significant effect on the 
behaviour of the youth. One indication is that once the programme was launched, it 
turned out that about 2/3 of the target group had left the group before the activation 
offer was given after 6 months. An empirical study by Jensen, Rosholm and Svarer 
(2003) finds that the programme had a clear positive effect on the transition rate into 
education, whereas the effect on transition into employment is more uncertain. 
However, since the low level of educational attainment of the group was part of the 
problem, the policy has contributed to mitigate this situation.  
The entry of young people into the labour market is still not without problems, 
despite the fall in the youth unemployment rate. In an international comparison, Danish 
youth start education relatively late and also complete their education with significant 
delays. This means that the social return to public investment in education is 
significantly reduced. This is, however, a general problem which does not in particular 
refer to groups risking marginalization in the labour market. In that respect, it is more 
problematic that about 1/5 of a cohort of young still do not get any education beyond 
basic schooling (residual educational group). Although about 95 percent of a cohort 
enrol in an education, the drop out rate is large implying that only about 80 percent of a 
cohort complete a secondary education. This fraction has been roughly constant in 
recent years. In this educational residual group, one finds an overrepresentation of 
children with parents who are unskilled and/or immigrants from non-western countries. 
These problems should be seen in the perspective that Denmark is at the OECD top as 
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distributional goals and the skill-bias in labour demand, it follows that bringing cohorts 
into the labour market where 1 in 5 has no education beyond basic schooling is 
particularly worrisome. It is well-established that employment possibilities are strongly 
related to education and qualifications, and that the risk of marginalisation is 
significantly higher for low educated groups. Calculations show that the returns to 
society from ensuring that individuals from the educational residual group get a 
vocational training (the most realistic alternative) are very large mainly because this 
increases employment chances and correspondingly lowers the risk of persistent welfare 
dependence (Danish Welfare Commission 2006). 
5  Work or welfare? – Risk of marginalisation 
The fact that many individuals are living on public transfers from various welfare 
programmes can be seen as an indication that these programmes serve a purpose. 
However, it raises the question of whether policies are mainly in a defensive position 
“repairing” problems, rather than in a more active position minimizing the risk of 
problems arising. Extensive use of welfare programmes may indicate that the system is 
malfunctioning, implying that too many fail to become self-supporting and instead 
become dependent on transfers. This is, in itself, a potentially large social problem, but 
it also raises questions concerning the financial viability of the welfare state since a tax 
financed extended social safety net necessitates a high employment ratio, cf. Section 2. 
It is well-established that social conditions may display strong persistency; hence, 
individuals who either do not enter the labour market with sufficient qualifications or 
become long-term unemployed face a large risk of marginalisation implying persistent 
welfare dependence.  
Considering long-term dependence on transfers (leaving out disability pensions and 
early retirement), one finds that the group having been unemployed more than 80 
percent of the time during the last three years and having actively been searching for a 
job is close to 50,000 individuals. This group has been reduced in recent years alongside 
the fall in unemployment. In addition, about 140,000 in the working age group have 
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sickness, rehabilitation etc. In total almost 200,000 or about 5 percent of the age group 
18-66 are thus more or less permanently on transfers (Danish Welfare Commission 
2006), and the size of this group has not been reduced during the period with a sharp 
fall in unemployment. A large fraction of this group may later be eligible for disability 
pension or choose early retirement. Hence, there is a non-trivial problem of 
marginalisation in the labour market leading to persistent welfare dependence. 
Moreover, a large fraction of those on social assistance and long-term welfare have 
problems in addition to being without a job. This includes health and social problems 
and lack of work capability due to various other problems. 
The gains from early intervention to prevent marginalisation are thus potentially 
large both socially and economically. An important element of early intervention is 
education and acquisition of relevant qualifications in youth; cf. the discussion in 
Section 4. For other age groups, it is important to ensure that spells of unemployment do 
not become too long, since long-term unemployment often leads to additional social 
problems and marginalisation in the labour market. The policy pursued in Denmark in 
the 1970s and 1980s overlooked these risks for a long period, and mainly had a passive 
focus on income maintenance. A paradoxical consequence of this passive focus may 
have been that it has increased marginalisation and therefore, in turn, welfare 
dependence. In the following, some of the reform initiatives with a more active focus 
are reviewed, and some remaining problems are discussed. 
5.1 Economic  incentives 
The combination of an extended social safety net and high labour income taxation 
creates a dilemma concerning the economic incentives to work. Shifting from welfare to 
work will often involve a high composite tax rate when comparing labour income after 
tax to the previous social transfer after tax plus eventual supplements or subsidies lost 
when in employment or obtaining a higher income. Table 2 gives an indication of the 
problem in terms of the difference in disposable income from shifting from welfare to 
work. For more than 10 percent of the population, the gain in disposable income from 
work is less than 270 EUR per month, and for almost 5 percent, it is less than 135 EUR 
per month (effectively implying a compensation for work which is less than 1 EUR per 
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and welfare, one finds an overrepresentation of long-term unemployed and immigrants 
from low-income countries. 
The same incentive problem can be illustrated by considering the average effective 
tax rate defined as the sum of the marginal tax and the marginal reduction of transfers. 
This is often called the participation tax rate for individuals outside the labour force. For 
low income groups, it is found to be around 80 percent with some dispersion (between 
62 and 95 percent), and this is very high in an international comparison (see Immervoll 
et al 2004; Kleven and Kreiner 2006). 
Table 2 Population distributed according to annual gain in disposable income per 
month from work, 2003 
  Group size in 1000 people  Pct. 
Less than 135 €  116  4.7 
135-220 €  73  2.9 
200-270 €  108  4.4 
270-400 €  281  11.3 
400-670 €  568  22.9 
More than 670 €  1330  53.7 
Total 2476  100.0 
Notes: Difference in disposable income between work and unemployment, taking into account income taxation, 
housing subsidies, subsidies for childcare, pension contribution and transport costs. Data are from “Law model” 2003 
and using 2006 rules. 
Source: Danish Welfare Commission (2006). 
 
An important issue is how actively the non-employed in the work force search for 
jobs. This is clearly difficult to assess quantitatively, but some attempts have been made 
via surveys. These surveys indicate that about 50 percent of the unemployed 
(unemployment spell of at least 5-6 weeks) are willing to start working immediately, 
and about 64 percent have applied for jobs within the last month, cf. Madsen et al 
(2007). However, in addition, some have restrictions on e.g. the type of job, its location 
and working hours. These numbers suggest that search intensity is on the low side.
13 
The welfare and tax systems thus produce a situation where the economic incentives 
to work are low and this may strengthen welfare dependence. This is an inevitable 
consequence of the tax financed extended social safety net. It is important to minimize 
the problem, however. One route is via an earned income tax rate which can lower the 
                                                 
13 The figures also indicate that not all individuals receiving unemployment compensation in Denmark may actually 
fulfil the ILO criteria for being unemployed. 
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deadweight loss. An earned income tax credit (in Danish “beskæftigelsesfradraget”) was 
introduced in 2004 in the form of a deduction in taxable income of 2.5 percent of wage 
income up to a maximum (EUR 965 in 2005).  
A problem with the earned tax credit is that it gives the maximum deduction to high 
income groups for whom the participation decision is not an issue. However, phasing 
out the tax credit over some income interval would increase the composite marginal tax 
rate over the relevant income interval and hence, lower the participation tax but increase 
the marginal tax rate, i.e. a trade off between the extensive and intensive margin is 
involved here. Despite these problems, it has been found that an increase in the earned 
income tax credit can have a noticeable effect on labour supply via the participation 
effect, see Danish Economic Council (2004).  
The above mentioned problem is a classical problem of targeting the measures to the 
relevant group, which in this case consists of people on welfare with a low economic 
incentive to work. On a small scale, a more direct targeting is attempted in the social 
assistance scheme via the cap on assistance, the reduction in assistance after 6 months 
combined with labour income being less than fully deducted in social assistance, cf. 
Section 2. However, these measures are minor and do not solve the problem of ensuring 
that sufficient incentives for labour market participation exist. 
Do economic incentives work for groups with long-term marginalisation in the 
labour market? For some in this group, the problem is insufficient qualifications and 
therefore, they are constrained from the demand side and accordingly, strengthened 
supply incentives would not improve the job prospects. But this does not apply to all 
and there is evidence showing that economic incentives matter. Pedersen and Smith 
(2002) found that economic incentives in the form of the net compensation rate matter 
for search intensities and the risk of being unemployed. Le Marie and Scheuer (2006) 
evaluate the effects of economic incentives for labour market participation for groups 
with a weak labour market attachment (recipients of social assistance and home-
working housewives). They also find economic incentives to play a role, and the 
elasticity of the participation probability with respect to the gain in disposable income 
from work is found to be 0.2-0.4. Empirical evidence thus suggests that there is a trade-
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whether it is steep enough as compared to political preference is another issue. 
Economic incentives must be expected to play the largest role in initial periods of 
unemployment, especially if human capital depreciates when out of work and if other 
social problems arise due to long-term unemployment.
14 This is an argument for having 
much focus on early intervention in policy initiatives. 
Finally, it should be noted that small or even negative gains from labour force 
participation also have an endogenous element. The lower end of the wage distribution 
adapts to the level of social transfer, and to the extent that individuals are heterogeneous 
with respect to pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of work, it follows that some may 
find it economically unattractive to work. 
5.2 Non-economic  incentives 
Strengthening incentives by lowering benefits or via the tax side is both problematic and 
politically difficult. This raises the question of whether incentives can be strengthened 
by non-economic means. This includes measures to ensure job market availability and 
active job search. The right and duty principle first introduced in labour market policy 
(1994 and subsequent reforms) and later in social policy (1998) are steps in that 
direction. The main instrument here is activation, which is essentially a workfare 
element, that is, to remain eligible for transfers some activity requirement is imposed. 
This could be counselling and training/education, job-training or subsidized jobs. 
Approximately 44,000 recipients of social assistance participated in activation schemes 
in 2005. This corresponds to about 1/3 of the individuals receiving social assistance (i.e. 
recipients of social assistance are on activation schemes about 33 percent of the time). 
About 2/3 of the activation were in the form of counselling and training, and only 10 
percent in job training. Activation “offers” have to be given no later than after 12 
months of unemployment (before 13 weeks below the age of 30). 
In principle, activation can have the following effects: i) a threat or motivation effect 
on unemployed individuals arising, since workfare makes claiming of transfers less 
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reservation demands, ii) a screening effect in the sense of making it less attractive or 
feasible to claim benefits without wanting a job (high preference for leisure) or at the 
same time as they are working in the informal sector, iii) a wage effect by reducing the 
value of the outside option for employed workers if they become unemployed iv) a 
locking-in effect by reducing job-search while participating in the programme, and v) a 
post-programme effect to the extent that the activity improves the qualifications which 
increase the job prospects (although a negative effect is possible if the job search is 
narrowed to specific jobs related to the training). 
Empirical evaluations of the effects of activation leave mixed results.
15 In general, 
the post-programme effects are only clearly positive in case of private job-training, 
while there is also evidence of locking in effects during participation (see, e.g., Danish 
Economic Council 2002, 2007; Rosdahl and Petersen 2006). There is some evidence of 
a threat or motivation effect.
16 Indirect evidence can be found from the fact that despite 
a substantial reduction in unemployment, wage developments have been stable, 
suggesting that the overall package of labour market and social policies in recent years 
has had an effect on wage setting. 
These effects of workfare policies should, however, be seen relative to the expenses 
on active labour market policies. Denmark is the OECD country spending most on 
active labour market policies as a share of GDP. Hence, it is an open question whether 
the effects are worth the money. In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on 
this issue and therefore, attempts have been made to “fine-tune” the use of activation 
policies. 
One example of this is the introduction of so-called match groups in 2004. The aim 
of this system is to identify individual capabilities and barriers to achieve a better 
targeting of the instruments. The match groups are 1) immediate match meaning that the 
                                                                                                                                               
14 Graversen and Tinggaard (2005) analyse whether the introduction of the cap on social assistance after 6 months, cf. 
Section 2, has increased the employment probabilities, and conclude that no such effect is present. This can be 
interpreted as showing that the groups involved are demand constrained in their job prospects. 
15 The effects of activation have mainly been analysed for insured unemployed, and to a lesser extent for people in the 
social assistance system. However, the qualitative findings tend to be the same for the two groups. 
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high match for individuals with abilities and qualifications which to some degree meet 
the demands in the labour market, 3) partial match for individuals with abilities and 
qualifications which to a weak extent meet the demands in the labour market, 4) poor 
match for individuals with severe constraints in abilities and qualifications relative to 
the demands in the labour markets, and 5) no match for individuals with abilities and 
qualifications that give no chance of finding a job. About 60 percent of the recipients of 
social assistance are in match groups 4 and 5, indicating that a large fraction has 
significant difficulties in meeting the requirements in the labour market. Moreover, in 
targeting efforts to groups with a high risk of long-term unemployment, a profiling 
system is used, i.e. a statistical tool to aid case workers in identifying individuals with a 
high risk of being unemployed after 6 months; see Rosholm et al (2006). 
Recipients in match groups 1 and 2 are required to sign up in job-centres as actively 
searching for jobs, and this also mostly applies for group 3. Activation requirements are 
also larger for this group, since they should have a new offer no later than 6 months 
after having ended the previous offer. 
6  The old – retirement 
Retirement from the labour market is a key question. For the individual, it involves 
issues like health, work-capability, pension etc, while for society, it is both a crucial 
factor for the overall employment ratio of importance for both labour markets and 
public finances and involves issues of inter-generational distribution and insurance. The 
latter is often summarized in the form of a social contract across generations, implying 
that the average person tends to benefit from the welfare schemes as young and old, and 
contribute to them while of working ages. This feature of the welfare state raises several 
issues of which the following focuses on two. The first relates to the balance over life 
between periods benefiting from the possibilities created by the welfare state and 
                                                                                                                                               
16 Danish Economic Council (2007) finds that the motivation effect is the largest positive effect on employment of 
the activation programme. A reduction in the average duration of unemployment spells of 3/4 of a week is estimated. 
See Andersen and Svarer (2007a) for evidence on the effects of workfare policies for the unemployed. 
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also involves an insurance element in the sense that those experiencing a significant or 
full depreciation of their working capabilities are offered possibilities of leaving the 
labour market (e.g. disability pension), while those being able to work should stay on 
longer in the labour market. Likewise the public pension scheme, which is a defined 
benefit scheme with a statutory pension age, has a life insurance property. The second 
relates to support as a retiree, that is, pensions but also access to health and old age care 
facilities supplied by the welfare state. 
The retirement issue has come into focus due to changing demographics reflecting 
the joint effect of the retirement of the large post World War II generations and 
relatively large trend increases in longevity (especially for individuals over 65 years). 
As a consequence, the dependency ratio increases significantly, cf. Figure 2a, and 
public finances will deteriorate significantly for given welfare arrangements (see e.g. 
Andersen and Pedersen 2006). Increases in the dependency ratio have been seen 
previously, cf. Figure 1b. There are, however, several factors making the adjustment to 
the predicted increase in the dependency ratio more problematic. One is that the 
problem remains, even if only current welfare arrangements are to be financed, which in 
itself is a very conservative assumption. Second, while it has historically been feasible 
to expand the welfare state, it has primarily been financed by an increase in the tax 
burden (now approximately 50 percent) and an increased (female) labour force 
participation rate. Since both are high, it is not possible to re-apply the historical 
adjustment mechanism.  
Retirement from the labour market may be involuntary or voluntary. The former 
arises in case the work capability is reduced to such an extent that continued work is 
considered infeasible. The main arrangement dealing with this problem in Denmark is 
the disability scheme, cf. Table 1, and access is based on screening. Voluntary 
retirement prior to the official statutory pension age is facilitated by the voluntary early 
retirement pension (VERP) (in Danish “efterløn”), which was initially introduced as a 
labour market measure but is now considered as a part of the “welfare package”. The 
effective retirement age is relatively low in Denmark, which is also seen from Figure 3 
where the labour force participation rate is found to be high in Denmark for age groups 
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pension age is 65, only 12 per cent of a cohort remain in employment until reaching this 
age. Direct exit from the labour force to retirement in the social security pension is 
therefore very limited. Incentives to increase the retirement age therefore tend to focus 
on VERP and the disability pension.  
In principle, the consequences of increasing longevity can be addressed in two ways, 
namely, either by adjusting benefits to expected longevity or by raising the statutory 
retirement ages alongside increases in longevity. Interestingly, Sweden has adopted the 
first approach, while Denmark has chosen the second, cf. below. The Danish choice can 
be seen as a reflection of the political barrier associated with lowering benefit levels in 
the welfare system, and accordingly increasing longevity will have to be addressed by 
increasing the statutory ages for access to early retirement and public pensions. 
In the following, we focus upon three key issues related to retirement, namely, 
disability pension, early retirement and the public pension scheme. 
6.1 Disability  pension 
Disability pension is a core scheme of the welfare state and, as such, is not up for 
debate. However, in line with the increased employment focus of the social security 
system during the 1990s, the public disability pension was reformed in 1999. The 
general idea of the reform was to avoid that loss of some work capability led to 
complete exit from the labour market, that is, the system should be more flexible and 
use the work capability, even though it was reduced. Accordingly, the criteria for 
obtaining disability pension were changed to focus on the individual’s remaining work 
ability. Disability pension is now granted only if work ability is expected to be 
permanently reduced so that the individual cannot be expected to maintain any 
subsidized job. Simultaneously, special subsidized jobs, so-called flexjobs, were 
introduced. The idea was to introduce a subsidy to compensate the employer for the loss 
in work ability in order to maintain a job. The subsidy is half or two-thirds of the salary, 
depending on the reduction in work ability. For individuals that are allowed a flexjob, a 
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17 
However, for individuals permitted to enter the flexjob system, the system of “rights” is 
not matched by “duties” like in the ordinary labour market. There is no limitation to the 
duration of unemployment compensation, no requirement for active flexjob search, and 
no activation measures. 
The reform has not been able to significantly affect the annual admissions to the 
disability system while, at the same time, the number of individuals in the flexjob 
system has been increasing relatively fast. By 2005, a total of 45,000 individuals had 
been admitted into the flexjob system with 35,000 in a flexjob and 10,000 receiving 
unemployment compensation within the system. The Danish Ministry of Finance 
expects that the long-term equilibrium is approximately 75,000 individuals in the 
flexjob system. Overall, the reform has thus not been successful in reducing the number 
of individuals receiving transfer income, and it has contributed to increase subsidized 
employment.  
6.2  Voluntary early retirement  
VERP may be considered as one of the major exceptions to universalism of the Danish 
welfare state and also the main reason why labour market participation rates for 
individuals above 60 years are lower than in other Scandinavian countries (Danish 
Welfare Commission 2005). VERP is a membership and contribution based scheme, but 
it is highly subsidized. VERP was originally introduced in the early 1970’s, with the 
dual aim of reducing labour supply (intended as a remedy for the high level of youth 
unemployment) and a retirement system for so-called worn-out elderly workers. 
However, no criteria for being worn-out were written into the legislation and the system 
developed into a general voluntary early retirement scheme.  
VERP is available for the age groups 60-64 years. Pensions are contingent on 
absence of income from work. The pension payments are comparable to the maximum 
unemployment benefits and therefore significantly higher than the pensions in the social 
security pension system, cf. Table 1. 
                                                 
 
17 If the individual becomes unemployed, he or she receives unemployment compensation at 91 percent of the 
maximum level of unemployment benefits. Similarly, a voluntary early retirement system comparable to VERP has 
28  IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State VERP has become very popular and therefore, it has turned out to be politically very 
difficult to change the scheme. However, a reform in 1999 aimed at postponing early 
retirement. The reform lowered the statutory public pension age from 67 years to 65 
years. Given the increase in longevity, this may seem paradoxical, but the reform was 
motivated by an effort to reduce the duration of VERP from 7 to 5 years of pension 
which was cost saving.
18 The reform also introduced a means of testing the pension 
from VERP if the person retires before turning 62 years. The means testing is based on 
potential income from labour market pension schemes, implying that individuals with 
high labour market pensions have less incentives to use VERP in the first two potential 
years. This part of the reform has affected the retirement pattern so that an increasing 
number of individuals actually postpone retirement until the age of 62. This accounts 
for some of the reduction in the ratio of recipients of transfers to the total population in 
working ages that has been observed in recent years, cf. Figure 2. Since the system of 
contribution-defined labour market pension schemes has been extended to blue-collar 
workers in the private sector during the 1990’s (see below), the effect of the means 
testing is expected to increase in the coming years. 
VERP remains an attractive alternative to self financed retirement in a private 
pension scheme, since the overall contributions fall short of the value of the benefits, 
even in those cases where early retirement benefits are only claimed for three years 
(from 62 to 65).
19  
6.3  The pension system 
The public pension scheme is basically a universal system, cf. Table 1. This pillar I of 
the pension system has been supplemented by a strong pillar II in the form of labour 
market pension schemes over the last 25 years. In addition, individual Pillar III schemes 
exist, and have been growing. 
                                                                                                                                               
been introduced. 
18 Although the social security pension is universal and VERP is not, the difference in pensions of the two systems is 
sufficiently large to compensate for the higher coverage of the social security pension. In addition, the reform implied 
that individuals on disability pension would shift to a lower benefit through the public pension scheme. 
19 However, this tends to reduce the tendency to retire earlier than the age of 62 (given current rules), since VERP can 
only be claimed if one fulfils the criteria for receiving unemployment benefits, and this puts some limitations on 
retirement before entering VERP. 
IFAU – Distribution and labour market incentives in the Welfare State  29 During the 1990s, a fully funded pension system was gradually introduced for blue-
collar workers as part of the wage package in labour market segments covered by 
agreements between the Danish Confederation of Employers (DA) and the 
Confederation of Danish Trade Unions (LO). Public employees and most privately 
employed white-collar workers were already covered by this type of funded pension 
systems. This extension of the funded pension system implies that the expected increase 
in total pension income per individual is higher than the expected growth in income per 
employee. The expected additional income growth implies that the average equivalent 
disposable income per pensioner relative to employed individuals in the age group 25-
64 years increases from 2/3 to 3/4 (Danish Welfare Commission 2006), including the 
effects from the means testing of social security pension.  
 The build up of the labour market pension schemes is interesting, since they imply 
that a large support problem for elderly citizens is being taken care of and ensure that 
the gap between labour income and pension does not become too large. In the absence 
of these pension schemes, a larger burden would have rested with the public pension 
scheme. The labour market pension schemes are thus an important example of a welfare 
problem which has been addressed outside the public sector and since from an 
individual perspective, it is mandatory, the scheme fulfils the aim of ensuring that 
everyone obtains a satisfactory pension. 
However, since labour market pensions are based on labour market income, it 
follows that groups with no or only a marginal labour market attachment will not have a 
significant supplementary pension (and since the pension schemes are in a build-up 
phase, this problem also applies to groups that have only been contributing to the 
scheme for a short period, or with low contribution rates). The group without a 
significant supplementary pension amounts to 1/3 of the current population of working 
age (Danish Welfare Commission 2006). This points out that the public scheme still has 
a significant role to play and also that the distributional profile among pensioners will 
become more unequal in the future. 
Finally, it should be noted that although the labour market pensions contribute to 
solve a “support” problem, they may thus also reinforce self-financed early retirement, 
especially for those who find that they are forced to “over-save”. The phasing in of the 
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decision, and this in combination with changing preferences (third life phase) may 
imply that the underlying tendency towards early retirement is strengthened at the same 
time as the policy aim is to ensure later retirement alongside increases in longevity. 
7 Policy  recommendations 
The future of the welfare state has been intensively debated in Denmark in recent years, 
focusing on challenges including demographic shifts and globalization. As a 
consequence, a Welfare Commission was appointed (2003) with a mandate to clarify 
the challenges and suggest remedies. The commission was an expert commission 
working independently, and it submitted its final report in 2006 (Danish Welfare 
Commission 2006). A guide line for the proposals made by the commission was to 
maintain the welfare system and accordingly, the focus was on ensuring the financial 
viability of the model by increasing (private) employment. The main alternatives of 
general tax increases or retrenchments of the welfare state were thereby ruled out. 
The policy recommendations of the Danish Welfare Commission (DWC) include the 
following parts: i) earlier entry to the labour market, ii) increased incentives to 
education, iii) increased incentives to employment, iv) a gradual phasing out of the 
VERP v) a reform of the flex job system, vi) an indexation of the pensionable age of the 
social security to the expected increase in life expectancy.
20 
7.1  Earlier entry to the labour market 
Given the high labour market participation rates for middle aged individuals, the 
potential for increasing the size of the labour force is most outspoken for younger and 
older age groups. One way of ensuring earlier entry to the labour market is to reduce the 
delays in the educational system. DWC proposes an earlier start in the schooling system 
by integrating the current pre-school class into the primary schooling system. In 
addition, DWC proposes that the resources of the currently optional tenth class of 
                                                 
20 Proposals also include policy measures concerning the production and financing of welfare services. These are 
ignored in this presentation. 
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proposed the introduction of bonuses in the study grant system, both for early entry to 
tertiary education and early completion of the bachelor level. The bonuses are financed 
by the removal of the study grant for students in secondary schools. 
7.2  More education  
The large drop-out rate of Danish vocational training and the poor performance in 
PISA-tests suggest that there are problems in the educational system. To ensure the 
“right start”, measures are to be focused on the primary schooling system and a 
particular challenge is to improve schooling for weaker pupils and bilingual pupils 
(descendants of immigrants). To deal with these problems, the DWC proposes the 
introduction of “all day schooling”, where resources are allocated to homework 
assistance to weaker pupils. All day schooling replaces the current voluntary after-
school system. 
To increase the focus on education, DWC proposes an extension of the youth 
unemployment programme to individuals in the age group 25 years to 30 years, cf. 
Section 4. This increases the time period before young individuals may receive social 
assistance in excess of study grants. At the same time, activation measures are proposed 
to start after shorter unemployment spells than for older age groups.  
In addition, the economic incentives for education are increased by removing the 
“middle income tax bracket” of Danish income taxation. The middle income tax bracket 
is a progressive tax element paid by the typical employee with a vocational training. 
The removal of this tax therefore increases the return on the investment in vocational 
training. Similarly, the income level to which the “top income tax level” applies is 
increased, which tends to increase the return on further education. The reduction in the 
progressivity of the labour income tax is financed through a gradual increase in housing 
taxation.  
Finally, as an indirect effect, the return to education is increased by both the earlier 
entry to the labour market and the proposed postponement of the exit from the labour 
market through the increase in the retirement age (see below). 
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DWC proposes a reduction of the duration of unemployment benefits to 2.5 years and 
the introduction of a “base level benefit” for individuals who have lost the right to 
unemployment benefits. The base level benefit is equal to the current social assistance 
benefit but is not means tested against spouse income as is the case for social assistance. 
This gives an incentive for the individual to remain in the labour force and participate in 
activation programmes etc. 
DWC also proposes to abandon the special rules for elderly in the unemployment 
benefit system. These rules currently imply that individuals aged above 55 may 
maintain the rights to unemployment benefits for a longer period than four years, and 
that labour market authorities may exclude this age group from activation measures.  
DWC also proposes a significant extension of the earned income tax credit to 
increase the monetary gains from employment, especially for the low income group. 
The earned income tax credit is financed by part of the increase in the public budget that 
follows from postponing the retiring age. 
7.4  Postponement of retirement age 
The major effect on the public finances of the DWC proposals is due to the increases in 
the retirement age. The overall idea is that the part of the expected life time that the 
average individual spends working is the same, irrespective of the increase in longevity. 
To obtain this effect, DWC proposes that the pensionable age should increase at the 
same absolute rate as life expectancy. If retirement on social security pension were the 
only exit route from working, this rule would tend to imply that an increasing part of 
life is spent working. However, since exit to disability pension is also a possibility, the 
rule tends to ensure that working life constitutes a constant share of life expectancy for 
the average person. 
In addition to the indexation of the statutory pension age to life expectancy, the 
DWC proposes a gradual closing down of VERP by increasing the entry age to VERP 
by three months more than the increase in life expectancy. The duration of the pension 
period in VERP will thereby gradually be reduced over time. 
Finally, the DWC proposes that the flexjob system becomes a less economically 
attractive exit from the ordinary labour market, both for employers and employees. The 
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ordinary retirement in case of indexation of the retirement age. 
7.5  Labour force and public finance effects of the DWC proposals 
The basic idea of the indexation rule in the DWC proposals is to redress the expected 
increase in the dependency ratio and therefore, avoid the pressure on public finances 
from an increased number of recipients of public transfers, cf. Figure 2. The gradual 
removal of VERP and the positive labour supply and employment effects of the 
remaining proposals provide sufficient revenue to finance increased expenditures to 
public services over the lifecycle of an average individual, due to increased life 
expectancy. Therefore, the proposals are sufficient to maintain the current welfare 
arrangements in light of the ageing population (Danish Welfare Commission 2006). 
However, it should also be stressed that the proposals of the DWC are not sufficient 
to finance increases in public expenditures to welfare services per individual that are 
higher than the general growth rate. Expenditure increases due to e.g. Baumol effects or 
an income elasticity above one therefore need to be financed by measures that come in 
addition to those mentioned above (for a further discussion, see e.g. Andersen and 
Pedersen 2006).  
8 Policy  reform 
Following the report and the proposals of DWC, a major welfare reform was passed in 
the Danish Parliament in 2006. 90 percent of the seats in Parliament were behind the 
welfare reform. The reform focused on two issues: Postponement of retiring age and 
increased incentives for employment. In addition, the reform increased public spending 
on education and research and development. The reform package does not deal with all 
policy areas addressed by the welfare commission, neither does it follow the details of 
all proposals, but it follows the main thrust of the proposals made by DWC. 
8.1  Incentives to employment 
The duration of unemployment benefits is maintained at four years, but full time 
activation is introduced for individuals with an unemployment spell longer than 2.5 
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reluctance to reduce income transfers and a higher willingness to use instruments that 
affect the amount of leisure of the recipients. Accordingly, activation is further fine-
tuned to reach the target of making benefit dependence shorter. 
The welfare reform follows the proposals of the DWC to abandon the special rules 
for elderly unemployed. However, since VERP is maintained as part of the pension 
system and pensions rights in VERP are conditioned on rights to unemployment 
benefits, elderly individuals who are about to lose the right to benefits are offered a job 
in the public sector, so that they keep their pensions rights in VERP. 
8.2  Postponement of retirement 
As compared to the proposals of DWC, the reform is less ambitious in three respects: 
First, the indexation of the retirement age is delayed until 2019, second VERP is 
maintained and integrated as a part of the pension system and finally, the indexation of 
the retirement age is linked to increases in the remaining life expectancy of a 65-year 
old individual, instead of the increase in life expectancy at birth (as is the case in 
DWC’s proposal). 
The reform implies that the earliest entry age into VERP is increased by 0.5 years in 
the period from 2019 to 2022, so that the earliest entry age is 62 years in 2022. Each 
birth cohort maintains a maximum period of 5 years with pension payment from VERP. 
Therefore, the pensionable age of the social security pension is increased by 0.5 each 
year in the period 2024 to 2028. In 2028, the pensionable age will therefore be back at 
the pre 2004 level of 67 years. 
Indexation of the pensionable age is introduced from 2025 for the entry age to VERP 
and therefore, for the social security pension from 2030. The indexation increases the 
pensionable age by 0 years, 0.5 years, or 1 year, depending on the increase in remaining 
life expectancy of a 65 year old. Indexation is performed every five years. The 
indexation implies that the expected period as a pensioner – VERP plus social security 
pension – remains at approximately 19.5 years in the years where indexation is 
performed.  
If implemented as stated, the reform stabilizes the number of social security 
pensioners from 2020-2025 and onwards. The delay implies that the stabilization 
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percent) higher than the current level.  
In addition, the number of disability pensioners increases both due to the fact that 
indexation of the entry age of VERP and social pension implies an increase in the 
number of age groups that are potential recipients of disability pension and due to the 
fact that non-universal VERP is maintained.  
The combined effect of the above mentioned three deviations from the proposals of 
the DWC implies that the increase in the labour force is both delayed and smaller than 
in case of the DWC proposals. In addition, the higher pension rate in VERP implies that 
the revenue effect is smaller than if VERP had been abandoned. 
Put differently, the reform will ensure that total transfer incomes will not grow as a 
share of GDP but only from 2020 and onwards. Given the indexation of transfer income 
in Denmark, this implies that the welfare reform succeeds in maintaining a fixed ratio of 
income transfer recipients to the working population.  
In case of the DWC proposals, there is a tendency that expenditures to transfer 
income grow at a rate slightly lower than general economic growth, due to the higher 
annual effect of the indexation scheme. Therefore, the proposal of the DWC implies that 
expenditures to welfare service may grow in excess of the general growth rate of the 
economy, without violating the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector. 
As mentioned, there are several reasons why one should expect public welfare 
services to increase at a higher rate than the general growth rate. First, increased life 
expectancy implies that a given individual receives public services in additional years in 
the future. If expenditures per individual at a given age increase by the general growth 
rate, this effect alone tends to increase the expenditure relative to production over time. 
In addition, one may mention both the Baumol effect that tends to imply that the 
relative cost of welfare services increases over time and that maintaining a given level 
of real welfare services relative to consumption will imply an increase in expenditures 
to welfare services relative to the general income. Finally, economic growth may imply 
that real welfare services increase faster than income, if income elasticity is above one, 
as is probably the case for a number of services, in particular health care. 
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ageing. A tight fiscal policy that keeps the growth rate of welfare services in line with 
the general growth rate is needed in addition (see also DREAM 2006).  
9 Conclusion   
The Danish experience suggests that it is possible to maintain a high rate of 
employment and a low rate of unemployment and, at the same time, have high 
ambitions concerning income distribution. It is, however, necessary to introduce non 
economic incentives in the form of activation programmes for unemployed and similar 
programmes for individuals receiving social assistance in order to be able to avoid the 
long unemployment spells and a large exit from the labour force into social assistance 
and other forms of income transfers. If activation or other “duties” are not an option, the 
formal rules for eligibility to the various types of income transfer must be used to 
reduce growth in the number of recipients of the given income transfer. 
In the case of social security, neither activation nor formal eligibility rules are an 
option and therefore, ageing tends to be a critical phenomenon for the universal welfare 
state with high income distributional aspirations, since the increased number of 
pensioners tends to increase expenditures and threaten the financial viability of the 
welfare system. 
To avoid this problem, the Danish Welfare Commission proposed an indexation of 
the pensionable age to the increase in life expectancy. Given this rule, the financial 
viability of the welfare system may be maintained by compromising the distributional 
goals. A subsequent welfare reform goes a long way in the same direction but leaves a 
financial problem calling for either a slower growth of welfare services or a less than 
full indexation of income transfers.  
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Comment by Oskar Nordström Skans
*° 
The paper discusses issues of fundamental political importance: Can a society with 
strong egalitarian preferences build and maintain a welfare state to provide insurance for 
its citizens without discouraging employment? Obviously, this is a difficult topic and in 
most cases, one will inevitably be faced with the need to compromise on either the level 
of insurance or the incentives to work.  
The paper draws on recent Danish experiences which constitute an excellent starting 
ground, given how much recent interest the Danish “flexicurity” model has spurred in 
many European countries, including Sweden.
1 The interest in the Danish model is most 
likely generated by the remarkable drop in Danish unemployment numbers over the last 
decade and a half. As the paper clearly shows, however, this development cannot be 
attributed to the flexicurity model as such, since that model was in place also during the 
preceding period when Danish unemployment numbers were high, often above the EU-
average, and always far above comparable Swedish statistics. Rather, the development 
appears to be a function of a strengthening of the incentives for unemployed to find 
jobs. From a Swedish perspective, many of these changes in incentives can hardly be 
viewed as controversial given that they meant tightening up a system which was 
extremely lax by Swedish standards. As an example, the duration of unemployment 
insurance (UI) was shortened from 7 to 4 years, whereas Swedish UI-duration has never 
exceeded 1 year.
2  
Unemployment, transfer dependency and employment 
Interestingly, the paper shows that the drop in Danish unemployment numbers has not 
been accompanied by a similar drop in the overall dependency on transfers. Rather, 
transfer dependency has risen almost linearly from the early 1970s. This is a crucial 
observation which serves as the starting point for much of the analysis in the paper. It 
 
* Oskar Nordström Skans is Associate Professor at the Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, Uppsala. 
° In writing these comments I have benefited from discussions with Laura Hartman. I am of course solely responsible 
for all views, and possible errors, in the text. 
1 The term flexicurity comes from the idea that the Danish model combines flexibility in terms of labour market 
protection, with security through the various incentives schemes. 
2 Although, as discussed below, a renewal of the benefit period was possible after participation in an active labour 
market program during the 1990s. shows how important it is to not just evaluate policies with regard to their importance 
for unemployment. Rather, we also need to know how they affect labour force 
participation and (ideally) hours worked.  
The insight that official unemployment numbers do not tell the full story hit the 
Swedish public debate in the campaign building up to the 2006 national election. The 
result was a major confusion over concepts, where various more “inclusive” definitions 
of “actual” unemployment were put to use. However, as nicely described by Holmlund 
(2005), the traditional definition of unemployment as the share of non-employed among 
those either working or actively looking for jobs, is a key statistic for understanding 
how the labour market works. It is an indicator of discrepancies between active supply 
and demand, and thus tells us something about the degree of market failure (broadly 
defined) at the labour market at each point in time. However, it does not inform us 
about the use of available resources in society. For this purpose, we need other statistics 
such as employment, or even better – hours of work, relative to the working age 
population. Andersen and Pedersen work along these lines and separately discuss 
unemployment and other forms of transfer dependencies. 
Having said this, it is clear that transfer dependency is not the same as non-
employment, and it is thus unfortunate that Andersen and Pedersen do not discuss the 
corresponding development of employment or working hours in Denmark. Is the raise 
in transfer dependency a result of people working less, or is it the case that those not 
working (or even those working) receive an increasing amount of transfers? A simple 
figure based on OECD statistics of employment relative to population (Figure A. 1 
below) suggests that the development of employment rates may be less worrisome than 
the transfer dependency numbers seem to suggest – in fact, the employment rates have 
not shown any signs of a trend fall since the early 1980s. The amount of work needed in 
order to be classified as employed according to these statistics is fairly low and the 
numbers do therefore not tell the full story. Nevertheless, the numbers do seem to 
suggest that the growth in transfer dependency may not be driven by a fall in 
employment, but rather by a growth in the subsidy rate at a given level of employment. 
Although, even if taken at face value, this result does not alter the budgetary impact of 
IFAU – Comment by Oskar Nordström Skans  41  
the growth in transfer dependency, it does suggest a different interpretation of this time 
trend than the one presented in the paper.
3  
From a Swedish perspective, it is interesting to note, in the same figure, that the 
Swedish experience is less encouraging than the Danish; the recession in the early 
1990s led to a dramatic drop in employment with only a minor bounce back towards the 
end of the 1990s despite falling unemployment numbers.
4 This suggests that the recent 
focus of the Swedish political debate on labour supply is well motivated – perhaps more 
so than in the Danish case. 



















































Source: OECD databases. 
 
The role of activation policies 
The paper convincingly suggests that the rather extreme development in Danish 
unemployment rates was driven by a tightening of the UI compensation scheme (which 
previously was extremely generous in terms of duration) and an increased use of 
“activation” (or workfare) policies. One of the merits of the paper is that it makes a 
serious attempt to discuss such activation policies.  
Activation policy is a topic of great importance also in the Swedish context. The 
active labour market policies which have been extensively used during a number of 
                                                 
3 The discussion regarding the relationship between employment rates and budget balance in the introduction clearly 
gives the reader the impression that the increased use of transfers is a phenomenon driven by reduced employment. 
4 In fact, the development of the Finnish numbers very closely follows the Swedish statistics (although, always 
below), whereas the Norwegian series is closer to the Danish. 
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started off as mainly “restructuring” devices.
5 During the crisis of the early 1990s, 
active programs could be used to renew UI benefits after the end of a one-year spell on 
benefits. This could be viewed as a system with never-ending benefits and reoccurring 
willingness-to-work tests through participation in active programs. During 2001 the 
system changed, programs no longer renewed benefits and the unemployed should 
instead enter a never-ending program when benefits expired. This followed the earlier 
example of youth policies which, starting in the mid 1990s, should provide all 
unemployed youths with program participation after 100 days of unemployment.
6 The 
names of the various activation components have changed over time but the basic 
principle, that unemployed should be hit by a program (which should never end) after a 
certain period of time, has remained.
7 In addition, social assistant recipients are subject 
to an increasing number of municipality-run programs which also often appear to take 
the form of activation measures. The scope for this was introduced through the Social 
Assistance Act of 1998.
8  
Thus, a discussion of the role of activation policies is certainly warranted from a 
Swedish perspective.
9 Unfortunately, the discussion regarding the incentive effects of 
activation policies relative to those of benefit cuts is not very enlightening. Contrary to 
the impression given in the text, it is obvious that both benefit structures and activation 
policies can be time dependent, have a stochastic element (sanctions), or be predictable. 
Furthermore, the “screening paradox”, stating that the unemployed not in need of the 
incentives are the ones actually hit by them, equally applies to both types of policies.  
The main difference between incentives in the form of lower benefits and incentives 
in the form of activation is in whether income or leisure is taxed for the long-term 
unemployed (assuming that activation policies or benefit reductions hit after a certain 
                                                 
5 See Calmfors et al (2001) and references therein for a discussion of the evolution of Swedish active labour market 
policies. 
6 See e.g. Forslund and Skans (2006a,b). 
7 Presumably as a result of the “activation” idea, these programs have all had names including the word “Garanti” 
(Guarantee). For young workers: Ungdomsgarantin, Utvecklingsgarantin, Jobbgarantin (current) and for older long-
term unemployed: Aktivitetsgarantin and Jobb- och Utvecklingsgarantin (current). 
8 Hjertner Thorén (2005). 
9 See Boone et al (2007) and references therein regarding the literature on how to design the optimal UI-benefit 
system. 
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period of unemployment). This distinction is mentioned but not explored in the paper. It 
should make a difference for the following reason: Imagine that there are two groups of 
unemployed, one which is unemployed due to low productivity or bad luck (involuntary 
unemployed), and the other due to a high value of leisure (voluntary unemployed). In 
this case, taxing leisure rather than income should hit the voluntary unemployed 
relatively harder than the involuntary since, by assumption, these individuals have a 
higher valuation of leisure. Intuitively, this suggests that the same effect on incentives 
for the voluntary unemployed would be found at a lower cost in terms of reduced utility 
for the involuntary unemployed.
10  
Although this reasoning seems to suggest that activation policies are always 
preferable to benefit cuts, it is important to note, as is nicely done in the paper, that 
activation is costly, whereas benefit cuts mean savings. Thus, all else equal, a system of 
high benefits and extensive activation policies is more expensive. 
Interactions between different elements of the welfare state 
A priori, it cannot be ruled out that the increase in dependencies of other benefit systems 
found in Denmark is a direct function of the tightening of incentives in the UI and 
welfare assistance systems. It is clear that increased incentives in one transfer system 
may move people to other systems rather than encourage them to go to work – Larsson 
(2006) and Larsson and Runeson (2007) convincingly show that changes in financial 
incentives in one system may, in a comprehensive welfare state, induce subjects to 
move into the wrong system. It is likely that such effects can arise due to benefit cuts or 
activation policies alike.  
Although this may appear as a minor problem mainly of statistical (and budgetary) 
interest, it may become a real problem if the transfer systems are attached to different 
support systems. An unemployed worker who switches to sickness compensation (as in 
Larsson and Larsson and Runeson) for financial reasons is unlikely to be able to fully 
use the resources available to job seekers at the public employment service. Thus, a 
                                                 
10 If the egalitarian preferences are, as (reasonably) postulated in the paper, over equality in consumption rather than 
utility, we are likely to prefer to provide insurance for the low productive rather than those with a high disutility of 
work. 
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resources are useful.  
This line of reasoning appears to suggest that all systems should be neutral in terms 
of compensation and activation requirements.
11 Indeed, this appears to be the 
motivation behind the harmonisation between social assistance levels and study grants 
in Denmark discussed in the paper. However, although neutrality is a reasonable first 
principle, the role of externalities should also be accounted for. In the case of young 
workers and education, it is, for example, clear that education is much more expensive 
for society than passive benefits. Thus, neutrality of compensation must mean that 
positive effects of education (for society) that counteract these costs are expected.  
                                                
Although it may seem obvious that education is more useful than unemployment, a 
word of caution is warranted: Is really more education always good, for all groups and 
under all conditions? Given that we, in general, are unwilling to accept that participation 
in labour market training programs is a good outcome in itself, the same criteria should 
hold for regular education. This means that the possible merits of education should be 
evaluated against the costs (e.g. in terms of lost job search) for the relevant group. In the 
worst case, these youths only hibernate in the education system and then exit into the 
labour market without having accumulated anything but lost time.
12  
The issue of education versus labour force participation for marginalized youths 
becomes even of more concern given the evaluation of Jensen et al (2003) which is 
reported to show that the main effect of the tightened incentives for youths in Denmark 
was in transitions into education rather than in transitions into employment. This is in 
contrast to Swedish evidence, presented in Forslund and Skans (2006a,b), and British 
evidence, summarized elsewhere in this volume (Brewer 2007), which suggests that 
youth incentive programs in these countries led to higher transitions also into 
employment. It is not clear why the Danish experience differs in this respect. 
 
11 See Larsson (2004) on a discussion regarding the harmonization of different benefit systems. 
12 In the evaluation literature, this is typically referred to as the “locking-in” effect; see e.g. Calmfors et al (2001). 
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Summary 
Overall, the paper provides an interesting exposé over different questions that follow 
from the problem of combining a welfare state with economic incentives. Since the 
topic is so complex, however, the value of the paper is first and foremost in highlighting 
some essential questions which should be addressed for a welfare state to maintain a 
high level of employment. These questions, which should all be viewed as interesting 
topics for future research, include such fundamental issues as: What is the relationship 
between transfer dependencies and employment, and why has the transfer dependency 
increased even though employment has remained constant? What is the optimal policy 
design in terms of combining activation policies and economic incentives for different 
groups? How should we think about interactions between different transfer systems so 
that the incentives do not only induce workers to work when they can, but also 
encourage workers to be in the right system when not working? How do we design an 
incentive system for youths so that we get an appropriate mix of education and job 
search activities?  
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